Relationship between labeled network games and other cooperative games arising from attributes situations

Encarnación Algaba, Sylvain Béal, Vito Fragnelli (), Natividad Llorca and Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 185, issue C

Abstract: We study the relationship between cooperative games which arise from very different situations. On the one hand, the labeled network game which is defined to study how to allocate a certain flow in a network among agents that control different parts of the network. On the other hand, the museum pass game which is defined to analyze how to distribute the profit generated by passes which provide visitors unlimited access to the participating museums. We establish that both problems are related in the sense that a museum pass game can be written as a labeled network game and almost all labeled network games can be written as museum pass games. We also point out that these classes of games can be related to other classes of games, for which we provide a generic interpretation in terms of attributes and population.

Keywords: Game theory; Labeled network games; Museum pass games; Shapley value; Attribute situations; Approval voting. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:185:y:2019:i:c:s0165176519303520

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108708

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