Two strikes and you are out! An experiment on exclusion

Jonathan Levy

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 185, issue C

Abstract: In many cases poor performers must receive a warning in the form of a strike prior to exclusion. This study provides a comparison between a two-strike exclusion policy and a zero-tolerance exclusion policy as a means for fostering cooperation in groups. The results from our experiment suggest that group members tend to cooperate more after receiving a strike. However, requiring group members to issue strikes to one another prior to exclusion seemed to be less effective than allowing for exclusion without prior receipt of strikes.

Keywords: Exclusion; Ostracism; Public good; Teamwork; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D23 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:185:y:2019:i:c:s0165176519303568

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108716

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