On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action

Zhenhua Jiao and Ziyang Shen ()

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 186, issue C

Abstract: In school choice, priority-based affirmative action favors minority students by means of promoting their priority ranking at schools. This paper investigates the responsiveness of the top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action when schools’ priority structure satisfies a certain acyclicity condition. When schools’ priority under the problem without affirmative action satisfies virtual homogeneity condition, a weak responsiveness result is obtained.

Keywords: Top trading cycles mechanism; Affirmative action; Responsiveness; Virtual homogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:186:y:2020:i:c:s0165176519302678

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108545

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