Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry

Bo Chen, Lijun Ma, Zhaobo Zhu and Yu Zhou

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 186, issue C

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of disclosing the actual number of bidders in contests with stochastic entry and with resource constraint. We study an all-pay auction with complete information. The auction entails one prize and n potential bidders. Each potential bidder has an exogenous probability of participation and faces an exogenous bid cap. It is shown that the contest organizer prefers fully concealing the information about the number of participating bidders. We extend the result to a case with endogenous entry.

Keywords: Contest; All-pay auction; Stochastic entry; Bid cap; Disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176519304082
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:186:y:2020:i:c:s0165176519304082

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108805

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().