A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model

Sarvesh Bandhu (), Abhinaba Lahiri and Anup Pramanik ()

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 191, issue C

Abstract: This paper characterizes status quo rules in the binary social choice environment. We consider the full preference domain which allows for indifference. We show that status quo rules are the only rules that satisfy ontoness, strategy-proofness and a solidarity property. The solidarity property that we consider, positively correlates the welfare of a voter to rest of the voters in case of her improvement. It is independent from the usual solidarity axiom of welfare dominance under preference replacement used in the literature.

Keywords: Binary social choice; Strategy-proofness; Positive welfare association; Status quo rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:191:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520301221

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109154

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