Dominant strategy implementation in a large population public goods game

Ratul Lahkar () and Saptarshi Mukherjee

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 197, issue C

Abstract: We consider implementation of the efficient state in a large population public goods game. Agents are divided into a finite set of types. The planner asks agents to report types, which generates a reported type distribution. Based on reported types and distribution, the planner calculates the efficient strategy level and a Pigouvian transfer for each type of agent. We show that this direct mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility in strictly dominant strategies, strong budget balance and ex-post individual rationality.

Keywords: Public goods; Externalities; Pigouvian pricing; VCG mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D62 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Dominant Strategy Implementation in a Large Population Public Goods Game (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:197:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520303761

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109616

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