Specialist vs. Generalist: Efficiency in Multitasking

Clemens Buchen, Jenny Kragl and Alberto Palermo

Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 199, issue C

Abstract: We show that under multitasking — where tasks can be substitutes or complements — a specialist worker with an uneven skill distribution can outperform a generalist with higher average skills. We use a principal–agent model to study worker efficiency and welfare. The main result is robust if a rent-efficiency trade-off is added.

Keywords: Multitask model; Incentives; Specialization; Generalist; Skills (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 M12 M52 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:199:y:2021:i:c:s0165176520304596

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109699

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