Stability and values for games with coalition structures

Takaaki Abe

Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 200, issue C

Abstract: Casajus (2008) established a link between coalition formation in hedonic games and players’ preferences over coalition structures. He showed that if a value concept for games with coalition structures (a CS-value) satisfies the splitting property and the aggregate component independence property, then the CS-value induces a hedonic game satisfying the common ranking property and yields a nonempty core. The following question was left open: What CS-values induce a hedonic game that does not satisfy the common ranking property but has a nonempty core? In this paper, we offer a set of properties that induces a hedonic game satisfying the top-coalition property, which is less demanding than the common ranking property but generates a nonempty core.

Keywords: Core; Coalition formation; Hedonic games; Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:200:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521000276

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109750

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