Partial passive ownership holdings and licensing

Stefanos Leonardos, Emmanuel Petrakis, Panagiotis Skartados and Giorgos Stamatopoulos ()

Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 204, issue C

Abstract: In a homogeneous good Cournot duopoly, a firm owns a cost-reducing technology and has a non-controlling share over its rival. We show that partial passive ownership holdings (PPOs) may induce licensing via a fixed fee and increase consumer surplus and social welfare. We thus identify a novel pro-competitive effect of PPOs.

Keywords: Partial passive ownership; Licensing; Fixed fee; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L10 L24 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:204:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521001877

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109910

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