Schelling’s model revisited: From segregation to integration

Ge Jiang

Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 205, issue C

Abstract: Schelling (1969, 1971) presents a microeconomic model showing that the individual preferences can transform an integrated city into a rather segregated city, although no player prefers segregation. We study the impact of location heterogeneity on neighborhood segregation in the one-dimensional Schelling residential model. We model location heterogeneity by introducing an advantageous node, in which a player’s utility is impartial to the composition of her neighborhood. When every player interacts with two neighbors, we find that having one advantageous node in the circular city will lead to a result that segregation is no longer the unique long-run outcome. When players interact with more neighbors, more advantageous nodes are necessary to obtain the same result.

Keywords: Schelling model; Evolutionary game theory; Advantageous node (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:205:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521002305

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109953

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