On the relation between preference reversal and strategy-proofness

K.P.S. Bhaskara Rao, Achille Basile () and Surekha Rao ()

Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 206, issue C

Abstract: We analyze the relation between strategy-proofness and preference reversal in the case that agents may declare indifference. Interestingly, Berga and Moreno (2020) have recently derived preference reversal from group strategy-proofness of social choice functions on strict preferences domains if the range has no more than three elements. We extend this result and, at the same time, present a simple argument for proving it. Our analysis points out the role of individual strategy-proofness in deriving the preference reversal property, giving back to the latter its original individual nature (cfr. Eliaz, 2004). Finally, we show that group strategy-proofness is needed to obtain preference reversal if there are infinitely many voters.

Keywords: Social choice function; Preference reversal; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: On the relation between Preference Reversal and Strategy-Proofness (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:206:y:2021:i:c:s016517652100269x

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109992

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