Efficient information acquisition with heterogeneous agents

Gianluca Femminis and Giulio Piccirilli

Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 207, issue C

Abstract: In a Gaussian-quadratic economy with dispersed information, we correct the inefficiency in information acquisition by making the tax rate on agents own actions contingent on actions themselves. This aligns individual and social evaluations of information quality. Our policy is robust to considering heterogeneous unobservable costs in information acquisition, since agents share a common evaluation of the benefit of information quality.

Keywords: Information acquisition; Welfare; Heterogeneous agents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D62 D82 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:207:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521003025

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110025

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