Sleep restriction and strategy choice in cooperation and coordination games

David McEvoy (), David Bruner, David Dickinson and Sean P.A. Drummond

Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 208, issue C

Abstract: This study explores how sleepiness affects decision-making in social dilemma and coordination games. Using laboratory experiments, we find that sleep-restricted pairs of individuals are more likely to play Nash strategies compared to well-rested groups.

Keywords: Coordination games; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Reference dependent maximin; Sleep restriction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C92 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:208:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521003268

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110049

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