Disclosure with unknown expertise

Run Li

Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 208, issue C

Abstract: We study a disclosure game in which a sender privately knows how much information she possesses and can disclose verifiable information to persuade a receiver to provide a higher reward. The receiver may attribute any imprecise disclosure to the sender concealing unfavorable information. We show that the most unfavorable possibility contained in information possessed by the sender will be fully revealed to the receiver.

Keywords: Disclosure game; Expertise (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:208:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521003396

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110062

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