Preference reversal and strategy-proofness with more than three alternatives

K.P.S. Bhaskara Rao, Achille Basile () and Surekha Rao ()

Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 208, issue C

Abstract: We introduce the concept of complete sets of preferences, that covers interesting cases like single peaked preferences, rich domains admitting regular social choice functions, and universal domains, and show that strategy-proofness is sufficient to obtain the preference reversal property when the voters’ feasible set of preferences is complete.

Keywords: Social choice function; Preference reversal; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:208:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521003608

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110083

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