Multilateral bargaining with an endogenously determined procedure

Hong Gao and Haibo Xu

Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 209, issue C

Abstract: We study a multilateral bargaining game in which a manager negotiates sequentially with several workers to share the units of surplus. The main feature of the game is that the manager determines the order of her bargaining opponents endogenously. The game exhibits double-sided hold-up effects: the manager can hold up the workers by switching between the workers, whereas the workers can hold up the manager by coordinating their moves. The interaction of these hold-up effects results in the multiplicity of equilibrium. Moreover, inefficient delays of agreements can arise in some equilibria, and the delays may not vanish even if the time interval between two offers becomes arbitrarily small.

Keywords: Multilateral bargaining; Endogenous procedure; Multiple equilibria; Delay in equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:209:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521004250

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110148

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