Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains

Sarvesh Bandhu, Bishwajyoti Mondal and Anup Pramanik ()

Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 210, issue C

Abstract: In this paper, we provide a complete characterization of preference domains on which the Unanimity with Status-quo rule is strategy-proof. Further, we introduce a notion of “conflicting preference domains” and show that the Unanimity with Status-quo rule defined over these domains is strategy-proof.

Keywords: Voting; Strategy-proofness; Unanimity with status-quo rules; Conflicting preference domains (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Working Paper: Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:210:y:2022:i:c:s016517652100433x

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110164

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