Effort allocations in elimination tournaments

Aner Sela

Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 211, issue C

Abstract: We study elimination tournaments with n stages and 2n symmetric players. The players have effort budgets that decrease within the stages proportionally to the efforts allocated in the previous stages such that for each effort unit that a player allocates, he loses α (the fatigue parameter) units of effort from his budget. We show that if the fatigue parameter α is larger than 1n−t+1, the players allocate their efforts equally over all the first t stages, t≤n−1. In particular, if the fatigue parameter α is larger than 12, the players allocate their efforts equally over all the first n−1 stages, and only in the final stage, they exert a lower effort.

Keywords: Subgame-perfect equilibrium; Elimination tournaments; Knockout tournaments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Effort Allocations in Elimination Tournaments (2021)
Working Paper: Effort Allocations in Elimination Tournaments (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:211:y:2022:i:c:s0165176521004894

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110261

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