Collusion between non-differentiated two-sided platforms
Martin Peitz and
Lily Samkharadze
Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 215, issue C
Abstract:
Platform competition can be intense when offering non-differentiated services. However, competition is somewhat relaxed if platforms cannot set negative prices. If platforms collude they may be able to implement the outcome that maximizes industry profits. In an infinitely repeated game with perfect monitoring, this is feasible if the discount factor is sufficiently large. When this is not possible, under some condition, a collusive outcome with one-sided rent extraction along the equilibrium path can be sustained that leads to higher profits than the non-cooperative outcome.
Keywords: Two-sided markets; Tacit collusion; Cartelization; Price structure; Platform competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176522001306
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
Working Paper: Collusion Between Non-differentiated Two-Sided Platforms (2022) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:215:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522001306
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110506
Access Statistics for this article
Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office
More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().