Dark Money in Congressional House Elections

Christian Cox

Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 216, issue C

Abstract: The deregulation in campaign finance, stemming from the 2010 United States Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, has led to nonprofit organizations with anonymous donors spending on advertisements targeting candidates. I study the effects of this “dark money” 501(c)(4) nonprofit spending on election outcomes in US Congressional House elections. Since 501(c)(4)s are not legally required to disclose spending to the Federal Election Commission, I use advertising data to measure their behavior. I estimate a model of the voter’s candidate choice, which is influenced by the spending of different groups. I find that 501(c)(4)s do not have significant effects on candidate vote share when accounting for the spending of candidates, parties, PACs, and Super PACs.

Keywords: Elections; Advertising; Nonprofits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 L31 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:216:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522001756

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110590

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