Cartel reporting under passive common ownership

Konstantinos Charistos and Konstantinos Papadopoulos

Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 216, issue C

Abstract: We consider the effect of passive common ownership on the efficacy of leniency programs to disrupt and deter cartels. Besides reducing deterrence, passive common ownership restrains the incentives of firms to come forward and denounce the cartel and therefore further favors collusion.

Keywords: Antitrust enforcement; Collusion; Common ownership; Leniency programs; Minority shareholdings; Silent financial interests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:216:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522001859

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110610

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