Impossibility of weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism

Sung-Ho Cho, Miyuki Koshimura, Pinaki Mandal, Kentaro Yahiro and Makoto Yokoo

Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 217, issue C

Abstract: Many real matching markets are subject to distributional constraints. When the set of feasible matchings is restricted by some distributional constraints, a stable matching may not exist. In contrast, a weakly stable matching is guaranteed to exist under a very general class of constraints that satisfies a condition called heredity. However, it has been an open question whether a weakly stable matching can be obtained by a strategy-proof mechanism. We negatively answer this open question; no weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism exists under any heredity feasibility constraint in general.

Keywords: Two-sided matching; Weak stability; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D63 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:217:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522002269

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110675

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