Using coordination games to measure beliefs

Robert Schmidt, Franziska Heinicke and Christian König-Kersting

Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 219, issue C

Abstract: Krupka and Weber (2013) propose using coordination games to measure social norm perception. We report the results of an experiment showing that their method is suitable for measuring beliefs more generally. Subjects are asked about their probabilistic beliefs regarding behavior in an ultimatum game, and they then coordinate on a number between 0 and 100. The results are indistinguishable from incentivized beliefs, at the individual and population levels. This indicates that coordination games can be used as a simple tool for measuring beliefs when there is no ground truth.

Keywords: Coordination games; Beliefs; Crowd wisdom (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C83 C91 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:219:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522003068

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110821

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