Full revelation of expertise before disclosure

Run Li

Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 221, issue C

Abstract: We consider the communication of expertise in a disclosure game. A sender wants to persuade a receiver to take a high-value action. The sender has private information about her ability to acquire evidence, called her expertise. After the sender communicates her expertise through a cheap-talk message, she obtains some evidence that she can (partially) disclose or conceal. The receiver wants to take an action based on the true information. We demonstrate that the sender’s expertise can be fully revealed through pure cheap talk before the disclosure game.

Keywords: Unknown expertise; Communication; Disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:221:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522003639

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110889

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