Stable and extremely unequal

Alfred Galichon, Octavia Ghelfi and Marc Henry

Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 226, issue C

Abstract: We show how stability as a solution concept in matching often comes at the cost of extreme forms on inequality. Restricting our attention to aligned preferences, we show that the stable matching results from the lexicographic welfare maximization of the pairs’ welfare, starting with the best-off. We compare this solution with an alternative allocation, that although unstable, maximizes the welfare lexicographically starting with the worst-off pairs.

Keywords: Stable matching; Aligned preferences; Lexicographic order (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016517652300126X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:226:y:2023:i:c:s016517652300126x

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111101

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().