Survival of altruistic preferences in a large population public goods game

Sarvesh Bandhu and Ratul Lahkar

Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 226, issue C

Abstract: A large population of agents play a public goods game. Agents’ subjective payoff differs according to their level of altruism. More altruistic agents generate greater positive externality in Nash equilibrium. The strength of institutions determines the extent to which agents can materially benefit from the positive externalities they generate. Therefore, stronger institutions confer evolutionary advantage on more altruistic preferences, enabling such preferences to survive and proliferate.

Keywords: Public goods game; Indirect evolution; Altruism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:226:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523001386

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111113

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