Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible

Hirofumi Yamamura

Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 230, issue C

Abstract: We consider the problem of allocating a fixed amount of a divisible and disposable resource among agents with single-dipped preferences. We introduce the class of uniform rules for this problem and show that these rules satisfy weak Paerto efficiency, envy-freeness, and strategy-proofness. In addition, we show that uniform rules Pareto dominate any other rule satisfying envy-freeness.

Keywords: Single-dippedness; Uniform rule; Strategy-proofness; Envy-free (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:230:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523002689

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111243

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