Designing contracts and information jointly

Kazuyuki Higashi

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 242, issue C

Abstract: We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem with hidden action. When the principal can decide on both information structure and monetary transfer, which relies on the stochastic output, then full separation or full pooling contract is optimal.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; Moral hazard; Monetary transfer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:242:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524003446

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111860

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