Pareto optimal provisions as outcomes of voluntary public good supply

Wolfgang Buchholz, Norman Kleinberg and Barry Ma

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 243, issue C

Abstract: It is shown that a large set of public good supply levels that arise in a Pareto optimal allocation can also be attained as public good provisions in the Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative provision game. With a not very far-fetched assumption on agents’ preferences this result even holds for all Pareto supply levels.

Keywords: Public goods; Pareto optimal solutions; Samuelson condition; Nash equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D62 H00 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:243:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524003975

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111913

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