Characterizing a probabilistic version of the Boston mechanism under weak priorities

Shanhui Yang

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 244, issue C

Abstract: We characterize the probabilistic version of the Boston mechanism from Han (2024). This mechanism uniquely satisfies respect for rank, equal-rank ex-ante stability, and equal-rank equal-priority ordinal fairness. Additionally, it uniquely selects the rank-based leximin-optimal allocation among all equal-rank ex-ante stable allocations.

Keywords: Random allocation; Boston mechanism; Respect for rank; Rank-based leximin (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:244:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524004774

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111993

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