Identification and estimation of incomplete information games with multiple equilibria

Ruli Xiao

Journal of Econometrics, 2018, vol. 203, issue 2, 328-343

Abstract: In games, the multiplicity of equilibria poses a challenge for identification and estimation. The existing literature typically abstracts from this multiplicity by assuming that the data are generated from a single equilibrium. Instead of imposing such restrictions, this paper provides sufficient conditions to non-parametrically identify payoff primitives in finite action games with incomplete information, while allowing for multiple equilibria. I then propose a two-step estimator and illustrate its finite-sample performances via Monte Carlo simulations. Furthermore, I study the strategic interaction among radio stations when choosing different time slots to air commercials. I indeed find evidence to support the existence of multiple equilibria.

Keywords: Multiple equilibria; Discrete games; Measurement error models; Non-parametric identification; Semi-parametric estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 C57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:econom:v:203:y:2018:i:2:p:328-343

DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2017.12.005

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