 ‘Sweet deals’: State-owned enterprises, corruption and repeated contracts in public procurementAndrey Tkachenko, Andrei Yakovlev and Aleksandra Kuznetsova Economic Systems, 2017, vol. 41, issue 1, 52-67 Abstract: We show how a price analysis of stable relations between customer and supplier in the public procurement of homogeneous goods can help differentiate opportunistic from honest behaviour among economic agents. We consider two types of stable relations: repeated procurements and connections based on the state ownership of suppliers. On the basis of a large dataset on the procurement of granulated sugar in Russia from 2011 to 2013, we find that for private suppliers, prices of repeated contracts were lower compared to one-time deals when procured through more transparent procedures and higher when procured through non-transparent procedures. For non-transparent procedures, we observe significant overpricing of contracts with state-owned suppliers compared to private suppliers, especially in the case of repeated contracts, whereas for competitive e-auctions, there is only a small difference between the contract prices of state-owned suppliers and private suppliers. Keywords: Public procurement; Corruption; Homogeneous good; State-owned enterprise; Repeated contract; Procurement procedure (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecosys:v:41:y:2017:i:1:p:52-67 DOI: 10.1016/j.ecosys.2016.12.002 Access Statistics for this article Economic Systems is currently edited by R. Frensch More articles in Economic Systems from Elsevier Contact information at EDIRC. |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.