Agent interactions and the response of supply chains to pricing and incentives

José Holguín-Veras, Felipe Aros-Vera and Michael Browne

Economics of Transportation, 2015, vol. 4, issue 3, 147-155

Abstract: The paper analyzes how the interactions among the freight agents influence the supply chain’s response to public policy initiatives based on pricing and incentives. The fundamental tenet of this paper is that, because of the role played by agent interactions in supply chains, carrier centered approaches are likely to be less effective than comprehensive approaches that exploit the power relations between supply chain agents to achieve policy goals. The paper characterizes the typical roles and interactions between the agents involved in supply chains; provides an economic interpretation of these interactions; and conducts a comparative analysis of the (limited) real-life evidence pertaining to the behavioral impacts of pricing and incentives.

Keywords: Freight economics; Agent interactions; Freight pricing; Supply chains (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecotra:v:4:y:2015:i:3:p:147-155

DOI: 10.1016/j.ecotra.2015.04.002

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