Predicting strategic medical choices: An application of a quantal response equilibrium choice model

Ge Ge and Geir Godager

Journal of choice modelling, 2021, vol. 39, issue C

Abstract: Quantal response equilibrium choice (QREC) models are structural behavioral models that account for bounded rationality and strategic interactions in analyses of games where each player’s payoff is a vector. We revisit the question of how market competition affects pro-social behavior and fit a QREC model to data from an incentivized laboratory experiment, where participants make decisions on medical treatments for abstract patients in monopoly, duopoly, and quadropoly games. Our results demonstrate that competition can cause substantial behavioral responses without any changes in pro-social preferences if one allows for the possibility that competition influences the degree of randomness in decision making.

Keywords: Behavioral game theory; Bounded rationality; Prediction; Quantal response equilibrium; Discrete choice modeling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C25 C57 C70 C92 D43 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eejocm:v:39:y:2021:i:c:s1755534521000154

DOI: 10.1016/j.jocm.2021.100282

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