Solidarity to achieve stability

Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Oihane Gallo, Elena Inarra and Juan Moreno-Ternero

European Journal of Operational Research, 2024, vol. 315, issue 1, 368-377

Abstract: Agents may form coalitions. Each coalition shares its endowment among its agents by applying a sharing rule. The sharing rule induces a coalition formation problem by assuming that agents rank coalitions according to the allocation they obtain in the corresponding sharing problem. We characterize the sharing rules that induce a class of stable coalition formation problems as those that satisfy a natural axiom that formalizes the principle of solidarity. Thus, solidarity becomes a sufficient condition to achieve stability.

Keywords: Solidarity; Stability; Coalition formation; Sharing rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Solidarity to achieve stability (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:315:y:2024:i:1:p:368-377

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2023.11.034

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