Screening for partial collusion in retail electricity markets

Armando Garcia Pires and Frode Skjeret

Energy Economics, 2023, vol. 117, issue C

Abstract: Starting from a theoretical model of coalition formation, we analyse which price markers are more adequate to identify clues of partial cartels. Based on the theoretical model, we argue that measures of the shape of a distribution (such as kurtosis and skewness) can complement centrality measures (such as the mean and the dispersion of the distribution of prices) to screen for potential partial cartels. We apply these price markers to price data from the Norwegian retail electricity market.

Keywords: Collusion; Partial cartels; Screening methods; Price fixing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D22 D40 L12 L40 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:117:y:2023:i:c:s0140988322006028

DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2022.106473

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