The strategic interaction between the government and international oil companies in the UK: An example of a country with dwindling hydrocarbon reserves

Bart J.A. Willigers and Kjell Hausken

Energy Policy, 2013, vol. 57, issue C, 276-286

Abstract: The 2011 UK tax rise on hydrocarbon exploitation activities obviously increases short term tax revenues however the longer term effects are less clear. The strategic interaction between the UK government, a producer and a shipper has been analyzed in a game theoretical model. A complex interaction between players is expected given (1) dwindling resources and large decommissioning liabilities and (2) the fact that much of the hydrocarbons produced in the North Sea are exported through an infrastructure with shared ownership.

Keywords: Game theory; UK tax regime; Decommission liabilities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:enepol:v:57:y:2013:i:c:p:276-286

DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2013.01.054

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