Do regulatory mechanisms promote competition and mitigate market power? Evidence from Spanish electricity market

Victor Moutinho, António C. Moreira and Jorge Mota

Energy Policy, 2014, vol. 68, issue C, 403-412

Abstract: This paper estimates the relationships between bidding quantities, marginal cost and market power measures in the Spanish wholesale electricity market for two different regulatory periods: 2002–2005 and 2006–2007. Using panel econometric techniques we find differences in the impacts on bidding strategies for both periods. Hence, the marginal cost and the market power measures affect bid and net quantities. The market power measures also suggest that the coefficient is consistently positive and highly significant for both periods.

Keywords: Capacity generation; Market power; Marginal costs; Panel cointegration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421514000263
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:enepol:v:68:y:2014:i:c:p:403-412

DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2014.01.021

Access Statistics for this article

Energy Policy is currently edited by N. France

More articles in Energy Policy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().