A game theoretic approach for the duopoly pricing of energy-efficient appliances regarding innovation protection and social welfare
Soroush Safarzadeh,
Morteza Rasti-Barzoki,
Seyed Reza Hejazi and
Md Jalil Piran
Energy, 2020, vol. 200, issue C
Abstract:
Recent developments in energy consumption ‘management’ have heightened the need for energy efficiency considerations in energy-intensive supply chains, according to the sustainable development framework. Therefore, policy-makers need to find out how they can improve these conditions, considering the resource limitations and energy requirements. According to these issues, we address a novel pricing model for new energy-efficient products, conventional models, and relative energy consumption under a tax-subsidy system. The products and energy services are made in a product supply chain consisting of an energy supplier and two manufacturers in a duopoly. Furthermore, the protection costs of innovation process such as copyright are investigated for the first time in this problem. Then, a multi-stage game model is developed considering two scenarios, based on different game structures. Finally, we solve the problem and provide a comprehensive analysis of the optimal values of variables and players’ profit. The results show that the first scenario has more advantages than the leader-follower competition. However, the second scenario results in less energy consumption than the first one. The findings also suggest that energy policies applied on the producer side are more effective than the consumer-side energy policies to improve energy-saving.
Keywords: Pricing; Energy; Social welfare; Innovation protection; Government policy; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360544220306241
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:energy:v:200:y:2020:i:c:s0360544220306241
DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2020.117517
Access Statistics for this article
Energy is currently edited by Henrik Lund and Mark J. Kaiser
More articles in Energy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().