Punishment or reward? Strategies of stakeholders in the quality of photovoltaic plants based on evolutionary game analysis in China

Minhui Zhang, Qin Zhang, Dequn Zhou and Lei Wang

Energy, 2021, vol. 220, issue C

Abstract: The quality of photovoltaic (PV) plants is one of the main barriers to the future adoption of PV-generated electricity, which is largely dependent on the strategies of stakeholders. Most studies analyze this issue from a technical perspective while ignoring the effects of the stakeholders. Hence, this paper analyzes the evolutionary trajectories of the government, contractors, and investors by establishing evolutionary game models under quality assurance and revenue-sharing contracts that stipulate punishments and rewards. The results show that the government has no direct effect on the quality of PV plants. Under a quality assurance contract, the quality of PV plants depends only on improvements in operations and maintenance (O&M), whereas, under a revenue-sharing contract, it depends both on development and O&M. A parameter analysis classifies the influencing parameters under the revenue-sharing contract into three types. The stakeholders’ initial willingness is a subjective parameter; solar energy resources, unit revenue, development costs, and O&M costs are objective parameters; the revenue-sharing ratio is an indirect parameter. Recommendations are made for the promotion of investments by the government and the PV industry.

Keywords: Photovoltaic; Quality; Stakeholder; Evolutionary game; Contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360544221000037
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:energy:v:220:y:2021:i:c:s0360544221000037

DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2021.119754

Access Statistics for this article

Energy is currently edited by Henrik Lund and Mark J. Kaiser

More articles in Energy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().