What are the roles of consumers, automobile production enterprises, and the government in the process of banning gasoline vehicles? Evidence from a tripartite evolutionary game model

Yajie Liu and Feng Dong

Energy, 2022, vol. 238, issue PC

Abstract: To alleviate the pressure on energy and the environment, and promote the upgrading of automobile industry, it is imperative to ban the sale of gasoline vehicles. Therefore, based on co-evolutionary game theory, we considered consumers, automobile production enterprises, and the government involved in banning gasoline vehicles. The main results are as follows. (1) When the potential benefits of enterprises selling gasoline vehicles exceeded the potential penalties, and the potential benefits of positive supervision for the government was less than the potential benefits of negative supervision, the policy of banning gasoline vehicles became invalid. (2) When the utility of non-gasoline vehicles (NGVs) was higher than the penalty for violations, the producers' excess revenue exceeded the research and development (R&D) investment in NGVs, and the excess incentive of the government was less than the cost of positive supervision, the system eventually reached the ideal evolutionary equilibrium status. (3) Changes in factors such as media exposure, the utility of NGVs, R&D investments, technical subsidies, and double integral prices affected the speed that the system moved toward an ideal equilibrium strategy. Our findings have significant implications for how to banning gasoline vehicles, which can guarantee the implementation effect of this policy.

Keywords: Banning gasoline vehicle; Tripartite co-evolutionary game; Media exposure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360544221022520
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:energy:v:238:y:2022:i:pc:s0360544221022520

DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2021.122004

Access Statistics for this article

Energy is currently edited by Henrik Lund and Mark J. Kaiser

More articles in Energy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().