Tripartite evolutionary game analysis of power battery carbon footprint disclosure under the EU battery regulation

Xiaoning Xia, Pengwei Li and Yang Cheng

Energy, 2023, vol. 284, issue C

Abstract: The EU's battery regulation aims to promote low-carbon and sustainable batteries and achieve carbon neutrality goals. However, in the actual implementation, limited government supervision, asymmetric information, and economic interests may induce battery manufacturers and third-party verification agencies to manipulate carbon footprint data. To prevent the occurrence of the above phenomena, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving battery manufacturers, third-party verification agencies, and national market authorities. The model examines the strategic decision-making process, influential factors, and evolutionary stability of the three players, followed by simulation analysis. The results showed that the evolutionary system may exhibit two stable states: (0,0,1) and (1,1,0), corresponding to two strategy combinations {disclose false carbon footprints, intend rent-seeking, supervise} and {disclose true carbon footprint, reject rent-seeking, not supervise}, respectively. However, if the benefits of third-party agencies objectively assessing carbon footprints are not substantial enough, there will be only one stable state (0,0,1) in the system. To guide the evolutionary system towards the desired stable state (1,1,0), supportive policies should be implemented along with the EU battery regulation. Therefore, this study puts forward some policy recommendations in terms of institutional improvement, database construction, and the application of emerging technologies.

Keywords: EU battery regulation; Carbon footprint; Evolutionary game; Simulation analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:energy:v:284:y:2023:i:c:s0360544223027093

DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2023.129315

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