Optimal operation of energy hub considering reward-punishment ladder carbon trading and electrothermal demand coupling

Haibing Wang, Anjie Zhao, Muhammad Qasim Khan and Weiqing Sun

Energy, 2024, vol. 286, issue C

Abstract: As the massive carbon emissions from the power system, the shift of the power system to low-carbon becomes inevitable. In this context, this paper proposes a Stackelberg game approach to develop the operational strategy of energy hubs, which considers the reward and punishment ladder carbon trading mechanism and the coupling of electrothermal demand. To avoid the fixed carbon price in the past and the neglect of the incentive space for carbon trading, a ladder carbon trading mechanism of rewards and punishments is introduced to effectively depict carbon trading costs. The electrothermal coupling of the demand side is incorporated into the Stackelberg game model, and the flexible consumption model of users participating in the integrated demand response is established. The above model is solved by combining heuristic algorithm with solver CPLEX, which can solve the data privacy leakage problem of both parties. Simulation results show that the strategy can bring economic benefits to energy hub operators and users. Carbon emissions across the system were reduced by 14.4 %. Users with electric heating equipment can fully improve the electric load and heat load adjustment level, and improve their economic benefits by 2.4 % at the cost of a 3.2 % increase in carbon emissions.

Keywords: Energy hub; Electrothermal demand coupling; Reward and punishment ladder carbon trading; Stackelberg game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:energy:v:286:y:2024:i:c:s0360544223029651

DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2023.129571

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