Impact of three carbon emission reduction policies on carbon verification behavior: An analysis based on evolutionary game theory

Xiaoping Wu, Peng Liu, Lin Yang, Zhuangfei Shi and Yongshuai Lao

Energy, 2024, vol. 295, issue C

Abstract: Carbon tax and emission trading compound policy (CT&ET), carbon tax policy (CTP), and emission trading policy (ETP) support countries in achieving "dual carbon" goals. Carbon verification is essential to these policies' efficacy. Policy changes will affect system equilibrium and present unclear risks to policy implementation. This paper compared the impact of three carbon emission reduction policies on the behavior of carbon verification subjects under various conditions, three policies' benefits and drawbacks at different stages, and proposed a dynamic penalty mechanism to restrain subject infractions. Finally, the simulations revealed three policies of system evolution path and parameter sensitivity in various scenarios. CT&ET best guarantees carbon verification quality has a high-risk tolerance, and restricts infractions in most scenes. The excessively conservative carbon quota and severe collusion penalty make CTP optimal for limiting ECE false reports. ETP reduces collusion best when carbon quotas are appropriately allocated. Adjusting taxes and carbon prices, increasing verification levels, and reducing false reporting will be easier under CTP and ETP. Dynamic penalties are particularly effective in limiting infractions. Static penalties stabilize compliance behavior effectively. This study proposed a policy parameter framework and optimization mechanism to improve the carbon verification mechanism and accelerate the "dual carbon" goal.

Keywords: Carbon verification; Emission trading policy; Carbon tax policy; Evolutionary game; Collusive behavior; Dynamic penalty mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:energy:v:295:y:2024:i:c:s0360544224006984

DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2024.130926

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