Cooperation, defection and resistance in Nazi Germany

Wayne Geerling, Gary Magee and Robert Brooks

Explorations in Economic History, 2015, vol. 58, issue C, 125-139

Abstract: This article uses the court records of a sample of individuals, aged between 15 and 62, tried for high treason in Nazi Germany to analyze a rare, real-world prisoner's-dilemma-like scenario that resisters faced once taken into custody: keep quiet and protect their collaborators or turn informant in the hope of obtaining leniency? We find that, although self-interest and defection to the authorities was the norm for most, significant rates of cooperation remained. We also find evidence that the size of the stake, age, education, beliefs, affiliations, and sense of community could play roles in facilitating cooperative behavior.

Keywords: Nazi Germany; German resistance; Prisoner's dilemma; Cooperation; Social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 N44 N94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:exehis:v:58:y:2015:i:c:p:125-139

DOI: 10.1016/j.eeh.2015.04.002

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