A multi-level model of family enterprise corruption
Isabelle Le Breton-Miller and
Danny Miller
Journal of Family Business Strategy, 2024, vol. 15, issue 3
Abstract:
Corruption is an important social and economic problem globally, and family firms are an important source of such corruption that we know too little about. By leveraging insights from the literature on family priorities, governance, and institutional environments, we develop a multi-level model highlighting why some family firms are prone to exhibit corruption in specific contexts. We focus on businesses where close connections between firm and family cause the priorities of the one to affect the other. There, family loyalties, conflicts, ethics, and social aspirations can enhance the willingness to engage in corrupt behavior. Private ownership and secrecy facilitate that behavior, as do tempting contexts with few institutional constraints. We provide examples and propositions for further research.
Keywords: Family business; Corruption; Governance; Institutional and contextual forces (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877858524000159
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:fambus:v:15:y:2024:i:3:s1877858524000159
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/719791/bibliographic
http://www.elsevier. ... 719791/bibliographic
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfbs.2024.100620
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Family Business Strategy is currently edited by J.H. Astrachan
More articles in Journal of Family Business Strategy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().