Corporate acquisitions and financial constraints
Seyed Hossein Khatami,
Maria-Teresa Marchica and
Roberto Mura
International Review of Financial Analysis, 2015, vol. 40, issue C, 107-121
Abstract:
Using a large sample of US acquisitions made between 1985 and 2013, we study the effect of financial constraints on acquisition gains and acquisition likelihood. Our findings show that financial constraints of target companies significantly increase acquisition premiums and abnormal returns for both parties. Our results further show that the presence of financial constraints in the target is one of the most important determinants of a takeover bid. This supports the idea that acquisitions may improve the ability of financially constrained companies to access capital through a better reallocation of resources within segments of the same company (e.g., internal capital market) or through better access to external markets. This would eventually benefit bidders too, as new capital would be invested in valuable growth opportunities that otherwise would expire unexercised.
Keywords: Financial constraints; M&A; Acquisition likelihood (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finana:v:40:y:2015:i:c:p:107-121
DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2015.05.007
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