Do institutional investors reinforce or reduce agency problems? Earnings management and the post-IPO performance

Huai-Chun Lo, Ruei-Shian Wu and Qian Long Kweh

International Review of Financial Analysis, 2017, vol. 52, issue C, 62-76

Abstract: This study investigates the dual roles of institutional investors in earnings management during initial public offerings (IPOs). Research suggests that institutional investors play a monitoring role in the corporate governance of firms by mitigating earnings management to reduce agency problems. However, institutional investors have incentives to opportunistically maximize their wealth by manipulating earnings when firms engage in IPOs. Results suggest that institutional investors facilitate accrual-based earnings management before IPOs but restrain earnings management after their issuance. We also find that firms with high institutional ownership experience superior post-IPO stock returns and operating performance, thereby suggesting that the capital market positively prices the monitoring function of institutional investors after IPOs, and the performance of these firms is improved. Our results are robust to controlling the endogeneity problem of institutional investors and further identifying active institutional investors.

Keywords: Agency problem; Earnings management; Institutional investors; Post-IPO performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finana:v:52:y:2017:i:c:p:62-76

DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2017.04.004

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