Government audit supervision, financialization, and executives' excess perks: Evidence from Chinese state-owned enterprises

Mengtao Zhang, Wenwen Li, Yalin Luo and Wenchuan Chen

International Review of Financial Analysis, 2023, vol. 89, issue C

Abstract: In recent years, the phenomenon of corporate financialization has become increasingly prevalent in China. This paper uses data from Chinese state-owned listed firms from 2006 to 2018 to investigate whether large-scale financial investments by companies facilitate executives' excess perk consumption, and whether government auditing, as an important component of the national governance system, can play a governance role in this behavior. The results show that corporate financialization behavior significantly exacerbates executives' excess perks, and government auditing can mitigate the effect of corporate financialization on executives' excess perk consumption. We find that increased cash flow is the mechanism by which financialization behavior positively affects executives' excess perks. Furthermore, this study reveals that the implicit corruption of state-owned enterprise executives through corporate financialization is primarily based on compensation psychology, which will reduce the effectiveness of monetary compensation contracts. However, government auditing can effectively constrain this influence.

Keywords: Corporate financialization; Executives' excess perks; Government auditing; Cash flow (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finana:v:89:y:2023:i:c:s1057521923002326

DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102716

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