Evolution of corporate carbon information disclosure considering the reward and punishment mechanism and new media environment

Tianjiao Jiang, Hua Li and Qiubai Sun

International Review of Financial Analysis, 2024, vol. 96, issue PB

Abstract: This study examines the internal logic and dynamic evolution of corporate carbon information disclosure decision making. Drawing on the game-theoretical relationship among enterprises, third-party carbon verification agencies, and local governments, we analyze the intrinsic mechanisms by which rewards, punishment, and media supervision influence corporate carbon information disclosure behavior. We further examine each participant's strategy selection process in the corporate carbon information disclosure decision making under different conditions and consider the impact of key factors on the process. The findings show that the best evolutionary stabilization strategy consists of true disclosure, compliance, and negative support. A stronger reward and punishment mechanism of carbon information disclosure helps achieve greater self-regulation and reduce false disclosure. Enterprises are increasingly choosing true disclosure as the probability of media exposure increases. Decision makers involved in the carbon information disclosure process are influenced by image loss, disclosure costs, and government regulatory costs.

Keywords: Carbon information disclosure; Optimal strategy; Dynamic evolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finana:v:96:y:2024:i:pb:s1057521924006021

DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2024.103670

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